n the past two decades, cultural geographers have turned to explore the ways in which landscapes serve political purposes. Landscape geographers have rallied around the theoretical point that landscapes are contrived scenes-(re)produced by power relations through cultural politics and social struggles-that present a particular way of seeing. This scholarship has further emphasized that landscapes often fail to represent the sets of social relations by which they are (re)produced. Cultural geographies of landscapes have subsequently focused on uncovering the social processes which construct landscapes as particular constellations of meaning, aesthetics, values and social prescriptions that become naturalized. Issues of belonging, exclusion and the creation and maintenance of boundaries have surfaced in recent considerations of the production of space, yet the relevance of boundaries and belonging for understanding the construction of landscape has remained largely implicit. 1 ©) 2006 By 'politics of belonging' I mean the discourses and practices that establish and maintain discursive and material boundaries that correspond to the imagined geographies of a polity and to the spaces that normatively embody the polity. By exploring the relationship between these concepts, I hope to make a contribution to theoretical perspectives on how landscape, defined as a contrived scene, provides a powerful means for bounding places and enforcing particular ideas about belonging to a polity and its embodied spaces.
To explore this relationship, I consider a controversy surrounding the operation of a custom slaughterhouse in Hugo, Minnesota, which was used extensively for Ua Dab, which is a Hmong tradition of ritual animal sacrifice. The presence of the slaughterhouse and the very different sets of human-animal relationships it presented in Hugo became the subject of a protracted struggle in which a group of Hugo residents and the city council were able to excise the slaughterhouse. The discourses and practices surrounding efforts to remove the slaughterhouse from Hugo, on the one hand, and to have it remain in Hugo, on the other, offer a case with which to explore the politics of belonging and the boundaries that they create in constructing landscapes. Before I elaborate the substance of this case, I want to describe in greater detail the ways in which I am approaching landscape and belonging.
Grounding the landscape idea
Landscape is a visual idea that structures a perspective about social relationships and how land should be used in a particular place.2 Landscapes thus offer a perspective of a particular territory and the community relations and identity of the polity associated with that territory.3 Like Lefebvre's category of abstract space, landscapes offer a whole scene in which certain material and discursive boundaries are constructed and seem stable, such that power hierarchies are evident and uncontested, and that particular arrangements of values, aesthetics and behaviour are considered normal or natural.4 Land-use zoning ordinances offer a concrete way to discuss landscapes and their inherent boundaries.
Land-use zoning ordinances are normative prescriptions about how land in a particular segment of space may be used, who should be present, and how it should appear.5 Zoning classifications effectively create spatial categories of acceptable social behaviour and visual aesthetic.6 Such classifications are also a useful resource to regulate space so that the material content within the boundaries of the zone represents the abstract and normative relations inherent to the particular classification.7 For example, land-use zoning has been used by municipal governments in the US to enforce racial homogeneity at the neighbourhood level. 8 The city of Hugo never expressed such reactionary sentiments. In fact, city administrators and officials never broached the issue of Ua Dab when discussing why Lee's slaughterhouse was out of place.57 Instead, statements from the city maintained focus on representing Lee's property as a commercial venture that conflicted with the normative activities and land uses in the area. As one of the city council members explained, 'A person ought to have an opportunity to make a livelihood. However, when you're operating a commercial activity in a pretty much residential and agricultural area, the two don't mix well. The cultural and religious aspects cannot be ignored. It has to be given consideration. '58 But the city council did ignore the 'cultural aspects' of the matter. The council articulated that the matter 'isn't an issue of intolerance for religious and cultural expression. The issue is about a system of permits and licenses designed to safeguard public health.'59 Furthermore, the city avoided discussion of Ua Dab entirely. Perhaps this was a move to avoid a perceived quagmire in multiculturalism or cultural relativism. Regardless, the city continued to frame Lee's slaughterhouse as a transgression of the city's land-use laws. In this way, concerns about cultural differences and racial prejudice were not given standing in the public debate and the city was able to treat the matter essentially as nothing more than a question of land use.
Following this logic, to the city and a group of its citizens Lee's activities had not only crossed a legal boundary, they were also inserting elements contradictory to the rural identity of Hugo. As a city council member explained to a reporter, Lee's slaughterhouse challenged a whole way of life and conflicted with the nature of Hugo:
We will preserve the lifestyle we have but recognize that we're not going to allow commercial slaughter in our city in light of our transitional nature. Hugo is firmly in the process of converting to rural residential usage even on agriculturally zoned property. As the debate over Lee's slaughterhouse developed, the city formalized its lawsuit to shut down the slaughterhouse. The city council also prepared to conclude the matter entirely by passing a land-use ordinance that would prohibit slaughterhouses altogether from operating in Hugo. Lee became exasperated:
I sacrificed everything to do this. Now they are trying to tell me that I can't do it. At first I thought it was zoning, then they said it was a nuisance. Now I understand. It's different. We're different. The city of Hugo is mostly white and here are these Asians and Africans. 'Oh, boy, that's going to bring the value of our property down. '69 As part of the legal process in passing the land-use ordinance, the council solicited public input on the matter through a public hearing that took place on 15 May 2000. This hearing, in addition to the city council's deliberation, offers further insight into the issues of landscape ordering and belonging surrounding Lee's slaughterhouse.
Reconstructing the Hugo landscape
The city council decided to remove Lee's slaughterhouse from Hugo because it putatively contradicted the town's rural sense of place. In doing this, the council maintained its classification of Lee's slaughterhouse as a commercial activity. Lee disputed the council's classification and argued that the slaughterhouse must be seen as a place for religious expression. The public hearing oscillated between these two points as neighbours of Lee As this council member explained, the removal of Lee's slaughterhouse was based on the idea that the human-animal relationships practised in Lee's slaughterhouse did not belong in Hugo. Furthermore, the city council member maintains that the decision to remove Lee's slaughterhouse is an unproblematic one based exclusively on a zoning or land-use logic. The declaration of 'incompatible uses' in this thinking has nothing to do with discrimination and concerns for religious freedom; indeed, the speaker unequivocally steered justification of the city council's decision away from crossing into the entangled ground that is concerned with racial and cultural equity.
In the end the council presented the decision to prohibit the slaughterhouse as a matter of respect for the identity of Hugo Figure 3) . The unwavering determination of the city council and some of Hugo's residents to deny the role of FIGURE 3 Outside the public hearing at the city hall on For Lee, the city's decision highlighted exclusive interests. While Ua Dab was not specifically regulated, its importance was not given any standing by the city council. Lee's and some of his supporters' attempts to represent Ua Dab as religious practice deserving constitutional protection was thus undermined. Lee's argument for why the slaughterhouse should have a place in Hugo, and perhaps why Ua Dab should be seen as belonging in America, never gained ground against the arguments for why the slaughterhouse does not belong.
Transgression and the construction of landscapes
The occurrence of out-of-place phenomena leads people to question behavior and define what is and what is not appropriate for a political setting ... We may have to experience some geographical transgression before we realize a boundary existed. 77 As Creswell explains above, transgressions are inherently geographical.78 They are geographical because they are a form of cultural trespass. To be out of place is to violate a community's sense of place. Furthermore, in identifying some social element(s) as a transgression, whether that is a group or a set of behaviours, boundaries are made explicit. After all, a border must exist for there to be some form of trespass. In many ways, the reaction to Lee's slaughterhouse can be seen as a case demonstrating the relevancy of Creswell's framework. The controversy over Lee's slaughterhouse in Hugo also illustrates more than this. This case illustrates that transgressions are moments in which landscapes are (re)constructed in order to fix a particular meaning to a place.
In Creswell's model, transgressions prompt the articulation of doxa (i.e. a set of social rules that are purportedly commonsense) which is then formalized as orthodoxy as a way to ward off future trespass by heretical elements. Transgressions are also consequences of power hierarchies, and occur when a dominant group objects to the actions of a subordinate group. In response to heresy, orthodoxies prescribe a set of relations that are necessary for things to operate smoothly in a polity and its associated territory. Orthodoxies offer a normative geography and a set of social practices that, if strictly followed, can be used to realize the abstract vision.79 The theoretical point that I wish to emphasize here is that landscapes, as a particular way of seeing, are visual and spatial articulations of orthodoxy.
Boundaries in the landscape
In the Hugo case, the revised zoning ordinance represents an instance where orthodoxy was articulated in response to an alleged transgression. The ordinance, which proscribed the slaughter of animals as the principal use of a property, implemented an orthodox set of rules concerning how land in a rural and agricultural district may be used. These rules were intended to restore the town's rural sense of place by codifying what belongs in the district and what could be lawfully excluded. Furthermore, the zoning ordinance creates a normative geography that maps how a bounded segment of space should appear. Thinking about land-use ordinances as an instantiation of landscape, one can see that orthodoxies contribute to the construction of landscapes.
The landscapes that (dominant groups') orthodoxies make have particular boundaries. These boundaries are explicitly recorded on land-use zoning maps. Yet, as the Hugo case shows, dominant groups also assert orthodoxies to control human behaviour and activities within demarcated spaces. In short, orthodoxies draw the line separating what belongs in a polity and its associated territory and what does not. These lines may be drawn between abstract categories, but these categories have spatial referents. These are the boundaries of landscapes. As Gallaher puts it, 'the boundary between "us" and "them" is not just an abstract line upon which mental boundary wars are waged. This boundary is articulated on the ground, in the construction, reconstruction and contestation of spaces. 80 Applying this logic, the removal of Lee's slaughterhouse from the rural spaces of Hugo was an act of purifying the agriculturaVrural-residential category and asserting Hugo's particular rural sense of place as much as it was an exercise in delineating the boundaries of where the agricultural category and Hugo's ruralness should be materially represented.
Landscapes and belonging
Orthodoxies draw boundaries, but they also define what should belong. Belonging refers to an idea of membership in a polity and its associated territory. Those groups located outside the boundaries drawn by orthodoxies are excluded. Landscapes The idea of exclusion of unwanted or undesirable elements is important to understanding the process of constructing landscapes. Denying Lee's claims for belonging highlights the exclusive power of the city council's land-use orthodoxy. As a corollary, constructing the dispute as a function of conflicting land uses undermined the legitimacy of Lee's claims of intolerance and the right to practise religion freely. The city council effectively excluded Ua Dab, intentionally or not, from the Hugo landscape. The council achieved this through a largely accepted zoning calculus in which particular behaviours and activities were legally proscribed (a calculus that might, in reality, negatively affect certain social groups). The council was able to apply this calculus because the nature of the dispute over the slaughterhouse was consistently framed as a clash of two irreconcilable sets of activities, which allowed the city to treat unproblematically the slaughterhouse dispute as a matter of proscribing behaviours and activities and not a people and their culture outright.84 By adopting a rationale that focused on incompatible uses and acceptable activities that agreed with the logic of land-use zoning, the city council was able to ignore the publicly expressed concern about racism, religious freedom and respect for cultural differences. This manoeuvre exemplifies the strategies of the 'new nativism'.
In contrast to the explicit racist and xenophobic sentiment of nativist movements in late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century America, the new nativism denies claims for multiculturalism in an effort to maintain a singular national American culture. 85 The city council, of course, did not regulate Ua Dab specifically. But The determined construction of Lee's slaughterhouse as a conflicting commercial use allowed the Hugo city council to place the issue of intolerance and discrimination beyond the limits of the matter. By applying land-use logic to evaluate the confrontation between Seng Lee and his neighbours, the Hugo city council members indeed seemed convinced that the issue hinged on nothing more than acceptable uses (in a manner of speaking, it was 'patently obvious' for the council members that landuse compatibility was at the heart of the matter). The detachment of this logic in turn allows the variety of motivations for creating such regulations to go unexamined. As a result, the clear exclusion of 'other' cultural practices can be treated as an unfortunate externality or as an incidental cost of maintaining the proper order of things. After all, if landscapes are the visual articulations of orthodoxy, then they are never constructed in error-by definition, orthodoxy is the 'right' experience or way of doing things. The scripting of the dominant group orthodoxy into the process of landscape (re)construction in Hugo further speaks to the exclusionary power of landscape, and helps to explain why Lee and his supporters ultimately failed to frame the controversy in Hugo as a matter that ought to be evaluated in terms of social justice. 
